

1.

24 Feb  
reaction to Sov NIE

- U.S. + USSR policies + conduct far outweigh other factors in Chinese assessments - neutron bomb, B-1, cruise missile.
- their assessments reflect use of public statements by Defense, military commentators, ISS, East Europe
- Use statements as quiet for propaganda will in PRM-10, Sonnenfeldt but fundamental assessment is sober + long term
- They read of + approved what they got of 11-3-8, 11-4 in 1976 during AIB team but treasury.
- Chinese remain skeptical of assurances of leaders not w/o some reason
- discount Soviet articles + rely on Soviet content + policies + distortions thereof exclusively.

Their own  
intelligence  
- comint  
- Sat coverage  
- VFR China from  
strip away policy

2. Roughly in balance although hangs on ~~existing~~ U.S. decaying power + Soviet aggressive expansion

- The Soviets lead + trends are in Soviet direction (thus NIE will reinforce this)
- A stalemate or Soviet advantage will make USSR more aggressive + more likely to use its superior conventional forces.
- U.S. will seek to use China against USSR
- paranoid nightmare about U.S. Soviet collusion - obscured by ranting about inevitability of war - ~~Referred to~~ <sup>1963</sup> Krushchev partial test ban 1963 was worst.